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Abstract 
 
In this paper studies of executive function in autism spectrum disorder are reviewed. 
Executive function is an umbrella term for functions such as planning, working memory, 
impulse control, inhibition, and shifting set, as well as for the initiation and monitoring 
of action. In this review, the focus will be on planning, inhibition, shifting set, 
generativity, and action monitoring. While it is known that these functions depend upon 
the frontal lobes, and particularly on prefrontal cortex, very little is known about 
neuroanatomical correlates of executive function in autism. The review acknowledges the 
complexity of investigating executive functions in autism, the possible influence of IQ on 
executive performance in these groups and the possibility of overlap between 
performance on tests of executive function in other neurodevelopmental disorders that 
are likely to involve congenital deficits in the frontal lobes, such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder and Tourette's syndrome. 
 
 
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder; Executive function; Frontal lobes 
 Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism 
 
Goldsmiths Research Online 
 
  
2
Autism is a developmental disorder characterised by impaired social interaction and 
communication as well as repetitive behaviours and restricted interests. It is a life-long disorder, 
with recent population studies suggesting that autism affects at least 0.6% of the population, and 
is three times more common in males than females. Learning disability (meaning an IQ under 70) 
is strongly associated with autism and is present in 25–40% cases of the disorder (Baird et al., 
2000; Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2001). In the absence of specific known biological markers, 
autism is defined using behavioural criteria. The clinical picture of autism varies in severity, and it 
is now generally agreed that there is a spectrum of autistic disorder. This spectrum includes 
individuals who are perhaps typified by the 'Rainman' character, through to those who could be 
considered a rather more 'high-functioning' subgroup, diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. In this 
review, I will use the term _autism_ to refer to individuals across the whole spectrum, and will 
distinguish the level of ability of participants in the studies reviewed as necessary. 
 
In recent years cognitive theories have been proposed and investigated in an attempt to 
understand the link between the brain and behaviour in autism. One well-known theory of autism 
is the theory of mind deficit hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that a fault in just one of the 
many components of the social brain can lead to an inability to understand certain basic aspects 
of communication (see chapters in Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000). Although able 
to account for many of the behaviours typically associated with autism, it is difficult to see how 
the nonsocial features of autism could be accounted for by the theory of mind deficit 
hypothesis. The non-social features of autism are rather varied; they include a 
restricted repertoire of repetitive and obsessive behaviours, rigidity and perseveration as well as 
an uneven pattern of intelligence. Such non-social features comprise strengths as well as 
weaknesses and are less well understood and researched than the social impairments seen in 
autistic disorder. Tests tapping factual knowledge, rote memory and focussed attention on detail 
can lead to peak performances, while tests tapping _common sense_ comprehension and working 
memory or strategic task planning can be surprisingly poor. These non-social features are 
currently explained by a number of cognitive theories and their variants. One theory, labelled 
'central coherence' can account for some of the patterns of strengths and weaknesses in autism 
and refers to an information processing style, specifically the tendency to process incoming 
information in its context—that is pulling information together for higher-level meaning (see 
Happé, 1999). In the case of strong central coherence this tendency would work at the expense of 
attention to and memory for details. In the case of weak central coherence this tendency would 
favour piecemeal processing at the expense of contextual meaning. Recently the extreme male 
brain theory of autism has been described. This theory explains the autistic profile as showing 
weaknesses in empathising and strengths in systemising, a drive to analyse or construct systems 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002). 
 
Over the past decade an influential account of autism has been proposed that is particularly 
successful at explaining some of the everyday behaviours that are seen in individuals with autism 
and which are not successfully tackled by the other theories. The major proponents of this 
explanation of autistic symptoms have been Ozonoff and Russell and their collaborators. In this 
review I will outline the key approaches to investigating executive dysfunction in autism and I will 
highlight— where possible—potential links between brain and behaviour. 
What is executive function? 
 
'Executive function' is traditionally used as an umbrella term for functions such as planning, 
working memory, impulse control, inhibition, and shifting set, as well as the initiation and 
monitoring of action (Rabbitt, 1997; Roberts, Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1998; Stuss & Knight, 
2002). Historically these functions have been linked to frontal structures of the brain, and to 
prefrontal cortex in particular. These functions share the need to disengage from the immediate 
environment in order to guide actions. Executive functions are typically impaired in patients with 
acquired damage to the frontal lobes as well as in a range of developmental disorders that are 
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likely to involve congenital deficits in the frontal lobes. Such clinical disorders include 
attention deficit disorder, autism, obsessive compulsive disorder, Tourette's 
syndrome, phenylketonuria, and schizophrenia (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Pennington & Ozonoff, 
1996; Sergeant, Geurts, & Oosterlaan, 2002). 
Executive functions in autism 
 
The theory of executive dysfunction in autism makes an explicit link to frontal lobe failure in this 
disorder in analogy with neuropsychological patients who have suffered damage in the frontal 
lobes and have impaired executive functions. Executive dysfunction can be seen to underlie many 
of the key characteristics of autism, both in the social and non-social domains. The behaviour 
problems addressed by this theory are rigidity and perseveration, being explained by a poverty in 
the initiation of new non-routine actions and the tendency to be stuck in a given task set. At the 
same time the ability to carry out routine actions can be excellent and is manifested in a strong 
liking for repetitive behaviour and sometimes elaborate rituals. Repetitive actions dominate in the 
daily life management of many people with autism. It is well known that they benefit from 
prompts and externally provided structures which initiate these routines or help them switch set. 
 
In this section, I will discuss studies of executive function in autism that have included well-
matched control groups. These studies will be grouped by separate executive functions labelled in 
the traditional manner; specifically planning, mental flexibility, inhibition, and self-monitoring. 
The emerging picture is rather unclear. One reason for this may be that many studies involve 
children and adolescents with a wide age range, and/or with IQs below the normal range (or at 
least ranging from below to the normal range). In contrast, the handful of studies that have 
reported on adult samples (individuals aged 17 years and older) have included participants 
with an IQ within the normal range. In this review, studies are considered in relation to the 
general ability of participant groups rather than age, although both tend to be confounded. 
Grouping by ability means that appropriate control groups di.er according to the ability level of 
the autistic group studied. For individuals with autism but without a learning disability, a 
chronological and IQ matched normally developing group would be appropriate. Other 
appropriate control groups, would be dyslexic individuals who experience a specific disability but 
in whom a general learning disability is not part of the diagnostic criteria. This disorder has not 
been associated with executive dysfunction. For individuals with autism plus a learning disability, 
a peer group matched for chronological age and IQ ability would be needed. This, in turn, raises 
its own concerns. Groups of children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) typically include 
individuals with no known cause for their learning disability (often excluding individuals with 
Down syndrome, for example), but what constitutes a learning disability and whether learning 
disabilities are independent of specific causes is unclear. A recent study conducted in 
California has suggested that along with an apparent increase in the diagnosis of autism comes a 
similar decrease in the diagnosis of learning disability (Croen, Grether, Hoogstrate, & Selvin, 
2002), questioning whether many of the children included in MLD control groups in past autism 
studies were in fact true cases of MLD. Some may have been cases of autism plus MLD. In this 
case, ambiguous results would be expected across studies since some groups of MLD controls 
might include a greater number of undiagnosed autistic individuals than others. Thus, an autistic 
and MLD group would be expected to perform more similarly to one another in studies where the 
MLD group unwittingly included more autistic cases than when it did not. These 
methodological issues have yet to be resolved but are critical when setting up research studies and 
evaluating the outcome of studies of executive function in autism. 
Planning in autism 
 
Planning deficits have been found in children and adolescents with autism (see Table 1). Planning 
is a complex, dynamic operation in which a sequence of planned actions must be constantly 
monitored, re-evaluated, and updated. This requires the conceptualisation of changes from the 
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current situation, looking ahead by taking an objective and abstracted approach to identify 
alternatives, making choices, and then implementing the plan and revising it accordingly. 
 
One typical task used to assess planning is the Tower of Hanoi, or the related Tower of London, in 
which individuals must move disks from a prearranged sequence on three different pegs to match 
a goal state determined by the examiner. This must be done in as few moves as possible and 
following a number of specific rules. Children and adolescents with autism have been found to be 
impaired on such tasks. This is the case in relation to an age-matched clinical control group of 
participants with various developmental disorders including dyslexia, ADHD and Tourette 
syndrome (Bennetto et al., 1996; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1991) as well as in 
comparison to an age-matched normally developing group (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). 
Furthermore, in the sample of individuals with autism versus mixed developmental disorders 
reported by Ozonoff et al. (1991), this impairment was maintained over time (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 
1994). In all these studies, the group mean IQ level fell just within the lower end of the normal 
range. The one study that has assessed planning in a small group of adult men with autism 
included only those whose IQ fell within the normal range. In this study, planning was evaluated 
using the Trail- Making B test (Army Individual Test Battery, 1944), in which dots marked with 
letters and numbers must be joined together in ascending order, alternating between numbers 
and letters (joining 1 to A to 2 to B, etc). The autistic group showed a deficit in planning on this 
test in comparison to a group of normal control men matched for age, IQ, and education level 
(Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988). 
 
From these studies it appears that children, adolescents, and adults with autism experience an 
autism-specific deficit in planning in relation to normally developing individuals and those with 
other disorders not associated with generalised learning disability. While the mean IQ level for 
each group reported fell within the normal range, the range of IQ levels included in the studies 
(generally a FSIQ greater than 69 although greater than 80 in the adult study described) makes it 
unclear as to whether the identified planning deficit reflects an effect of autism in all 
individuals or of learning disability in some. Some light may be shed on this question if we 
consider a detailed study employing a form of Tower task in an autism group in comparison to 
two control groups, one matched for age and learning disability, and the other for ability level. 
 
Hughes et al. (1994) used a variant of the Tower of Hanoi/London task, the 'Stockings of 
Cambridge,' in which puzzles are presented in a computerised format. This allowed comparison of 
performance on several different components of Tower tasks. Each puzzle presented had a yoked 
control item that provided baseline reaction time and motor execution times for each puzzle. In 
this way, initial planning times and thinking times could be estimated. In this study, the 
performance of children and adolescents with autism was compared to that of two control groups. 
One control group was matched to the autistic individuals for age and (moderate) 
learning disability and the other was a younger normally developing control group selected to 
match the approximate verbal and non-verbal mental ages of the autistic participants. On this test 
the autistic group was impaired relative to both comparison groups. However, this autism-specific 
planning deficit was not universal across all instances of the planning task. The authors divided 
the puzzles according to the number of moves required to move from start- to end-state, 
categorising the puzzles as one of two types. 'Easy' puzzles required two or three moves to reach 
the end-state, whereas 'difficult' puzzles required four or five moves to do so. The autistic 
deficit was seen only on those puzzles conceptualised as 'difficult,' and not on 'easy' puzzles. This 
suggests that autistic individuals do not struggle with planning across the board, rather that 
difficulties with planning exist at more complex levels. In day-to- day life it is likely that planning 
occurs almost entirely at this complex level. This might explain why planning appears to be 
particularly problematic to autistic individuals in their daily lives. 
 
In the Hughes et al. (1994) study, a non-executive explanation of an autism deficit could be ruled 
out. The inclusion of the yoked control puzzles identified that the difference between the autistic 
and comparison groups was not due to motoric impulsivity in the autistic group but rather to a 
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planning impairment. In addition, each participant group was divided into two on the basis of 
non-verbal mental age. For the easy problems, those participants in each participant group with 
higher nonverbal mental ages showed faster initiation times. For all puzzles, these same 
participants showed shorter mean motor execution times per move, in comparison to 
those individuals in each group with low non-verbal mental ages. This finding suggests 
that general ability per se has at least some influence on successful planning abilities, and that 
autism is not by any means the only cause of the observed deficit. Autism may be a contributing 
factor, indeed autism plus learning disability may lead to an additive deficit. 
 
Overall, then, children, adolescents, and adults with autism exhibit a planning impairment, as 
assessed by Tower tasks. Furthermore, studies that have used alternative tests considered to 
assess planning have highlighted impairments in children with autism. Slowed performance on 
the Milner mazes (Milner, 1965) was reported by Prior and Hoffmann (1990) in comparison to 
two control groups matched for either chronological or mental age. In addition Hughes (1996) 
found that autistic children were impaired in their planning of underhand reaches on Luria's bar 
task. In this simple 'reach, grasp, and place' task the use of particular hand positions leads to 
either comfortable or awkward final hand positions depending upon an individual's planning 
ability. These results suggest an autistic planning deficit for a simple goal-directed motor act, 
again in relation to an age and learning disability matched comparison group as well as a younger 
normally developing comparison group. 
 
However, negative results have also been found. Mari, Castiello, Marks, Marraffa, and Prior 
(2003) have reported a planning deficit in a kinematic reach-to-grasp task in low-IQ (70–79 IQ 
points) autistic children in comparison to both average-IQ autistic (80–109 IQ points) and 
chronologically age matched normally developing children, suggesting that planning in their task 
was related to IQ rather than to autism. Furthermore, performance on the Mazes subtest from the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-R, Wechsler, 1974) did not distinguish 
between the performance of a group of children with high-functioning autism in comparison to a 
group of children with a developmental language disorder (DLD; Liss et al., 2001). These two 
groups were matched for chronological age, socioeconomic status, full scale IQ and non-verbal IQ. 
The DLD group had a significantly higher mean verbal IQ than the autistic group. Unfortunately 
no non-disordered control group was included. Recently Bishop and Norbury (2002) reported 
that children with autism cannot be as clearly discriminated, on the basis of parental report, 
teacher report, and behavioural observation, from children with language impairments 
as diagnostic criteria dictate. Thus, the finding reported by Liss et al. may reflect 
diagnostic overlap or similar cognitive processing impairments between these two groups that 
would indicate that a language disordered group is not the right comparison group if we are to 
understand executive functioning in autism. 
 
Thus, while the picture of executive dysfunction in autism with regard to planning may seem 
clear, careful consideration of the issues suggests that the waters are muddy. It may be more 
informative to focus on the influence of learning disability on planning performance, as well as 
any additive effect of autism plus learning disability before being able to come to reliable 
conclusions as to the nature of any planning deficit in autism and the implications of this for a 
specified theory of executive dysfunction. A further difficulty is the choice of tasks that can be 
used to assess executive functioning reliably. Tasks such as the Tower tasks are complex and 
involve a number of processes over and above planning per se (e.g., working memory, 
inhibition of prepotent but inefficient subgoal moves). These need to be well controlled in future 
studies. Moreover, within the normal population such planning tests have been shown to have low 
test–retest reliability (Bishop, Aamodt-Leeper, Creswell, McGurk, & Skuse, 2001; Lowe & Rabbitt, 
1998). As Bishop et al. have reported, this suggests that we should be cautious when using these 
tests to index the integrity or maturation of underlying neurological systems in children. 
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Mental flexibility in autism 
 
Mental flexibility is another executive function, and is often termed 'set-shifting' or cognitive 
flexibility. These terms refer to the ability to shift to a different thought or action according to 
changes in a situation. Poor mental flexibility (used here interchangeably with the term set-
shifting) is illustrated by perseverative, stereotyped behaviour, and di.culties in the regulation and 
modulation of motor acts. 
 
Perseveration is a widely acknowledged consequence of poor executive functioning that is seen in 
autistic individuals. Perseveration in autism has been attributed to a deficit in mental flexibility. 
One example of this is seen when performing the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Heaton, 
Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993; Nelson, 1976). In this task an individual must sort cards on 
one of three possible dimensions (colour, number, and shape) according to a non-spoken rule and 
then shift to sort cards along a different dimension. On this task, the experimenter tells the 
participant whether s/he has placed the card correctly (i.e., followed the correct rule), but does 
not give the participant the rule explicitly. On this task, a perseverative error is viewed as a failure 
to shift set to the new sorting criterion. A number of studies have employed the WCST and 
although comparison is hindered by the use of different measures for scoring (e.g., total number 
of errors, number of perseverative errors, and categories completed), studies have tended to focus 
on the number of perseverative responses shown by participants. Autistic children and 
adolescents are highly perseverative in their response to this task. That is, autistic 
individuals have difficulty in shifting to sort using the second of two rules, rather they continue to 
sort using the .rst rule. This is true in comparison to both normally developing comparison groups 
(Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Prior & Hoffmann, 1990) and clinical groups including children with 
language impairments, dyslexia, and ADHD (Bennetto et al., 1996; Liss et al., 2001; Ozonoff & 
Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1991) and those with psychiatric conditions (Szatmari, Tuff, Allen, 
Finlayson, & Bartolucci, 1990; but see Nyden, Gillberg, Hjelmquist, & Heiman, 1999). Ozonoff 
and McEvoy (1994) followed up the participants reported by Ozonoff et al. (1991) and found a 
continuing impairment in the number of perseverations made on the WCST by autistic children 
and adolescents, in comparison to a well-matched clinical control group of children and 
adolescents with developmental disorders such as dyslexia and ADHD. The finding of a significant 
deficit on the WCST is not restricted to Western cultures, having been reported in a group of 
Taiwanese autistic children in comparison to an age-matched normally developing control group 
(Shu, Lung, Tien, & Chen, 2001). Thus, studies of individuals with autism which include at least 
some individuals that would be considered to show a learning disability suggest increased rates 
of perseveration in individuals with autism on the WCST. While the perseverative responses on 
the WCST of these individuals have not been related to their perseverative tendencies in daily life, 
the findings would be suggestive of this. A summary of studies investigating mental flexibility in 
autism is given in Table 2. 
 
What of the performance of autistic individuals in which the whole autistic group is made up of 
individuals whose IQs fall within the normal range? Such studies appear to have been conducted 
only in adults. Indeed, Rumsey (1985) was perhaps the first to report performance on this test 
with an autistic group, reporting that the autistic adults were impaired relative to a control sample 
matched for age, IQ, gender, and education level on a wide range of measures, including number 
of categories correct and perseverative errors. In two later studies, the number of categories 
completed was reported for autistic men in relation to comparison groups matched for age, IQ, 
gender, handedness, and education level. Autistic adults were impaired on the WCST in 
comparison to both normal controls (Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988, 1990) and to a dyslexic control 
group (Rumsey & Hamburger, 1990). However, it should perhaps be noted that while all autistic 
individuals in these three studies had a FSIQ of 80 or above, the range of FSIQ in the control 
groups was higher, reported to range between 90 and 119. Steel et al. (1984) have also reported 
the case of an autistic adult (D.S.) with an IQ in the low normal range (measured as 81–91) 
who showed perseverative responses on the WCST in comparison to standardised data. 
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Do autistic individuals perform poorly on the WCST across the board? Perhaps not. Minshew et 
al. (1992) reported no difference between the number of perseverative errors produced by a group 
of adults and adolescents with autism (FSIQ greater than 70 in each participant) and a well-
matched age, IQ, gender, and ethnic origin normal control group on the WCST. This is in contrast 
to the results reported in the Rumsey and Hamburger studies which had employed an autistic 
group with a slightly higher level of IQ. It seems likely, however, that this difference arises 
from the nature of the measures used across the two studies. However, it should be noted that 
some significant differences on WCST measures disappear when the effects of verbal IQ or full-
scale IQ are removed from the analysis. While this statistical manipulation has not been 
considered in many studies, it has been shown to remove significant group differences on percent 
perseverative errors (Rumsey, 1985), number of perseverative errors (Liss et al., 2001; Rumsey, 
1985) and number of non-perseverative errors (Rumsey, 1985). Therefore, perseverative ability 
may be highly related to verbal IQ. In this light, it would seem appropriate to co-vary verbal IQ in 
future studies irrespective of whether comparison groups have been matched for verbal ability. 
 
Do any measures of the WCST appear to be impaired consistently in autistic samples, irrespective 
of the test measures or comparison groups adopted? A summary of studies employing the WCST 
indicates that autistic deficits are seen most consistently in terms of the number of categories 
correct and total number of errors made. The picture may be clouded because of the general 
emphasis on perseverative errors alone when using the WCST. Patients with acquired damage to 
the prefrontal cortex have been shown to make as many random as perseverative errors on the 
WCST (Stuss & Knight, 2002), and this may also be a truer reflection of the autistic 
profile. Detailed study of performance on the WCST by patients with focal frontal lobe lesions has 
revealed varying performance profiles according to the site of the lesion (Stuss et al., 2000), 
which may contribute to a clearer understanding of the varied autism profile on this task. While 
the summary presented here seems to eliminate increased perseveration as accounting for the 
impaired performance of autistic groups, this is not to suggest that perseveration is not seen 
widely on the WCST, or that perseverative behaviour is not a difficulty seen in autistic individuals. 
On the contrary, perseverative behaviour is seen widely in the daily life of autistic 
individuals. Indeed, increased perseverative errors have also been shown in a language task 
(Waterhouse & Fein, 1982). Detailed research is needed to establish whether 
perseverative behaviour occurs across the autism spectrum or is constrained to those 
falling below a certain ability level, and whether perseverative behaviour is related directly to 
stereotyped and rigid behaviour in everyday life, as shown in highly repetitive thought and action. 
 
One study has documented the performance of autistic children and adolescents on a test of set-
shifting that is not the WCST. Hughes et al. (1994) report performance on the Intradimensional–
extradimensional shift (ID/ED shift) task of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated 
Battery (CANTAB). This ID/ED shift task is simpler than the WCST, allowing participation by a 
wider range of individuals. The task is presented in several stages, providing a more precise 
identification of the locus of difficulty on a set-shifting task than is possible using the WCST. In 
the test, discrimination must be made between one of two (or in later stages, four) stimuli, with 
shifts in discrimination required within- (ID) and between- (ED) set (pink shapes and white lines, 
respectively). Hughes et al. tested children and adolescents with autism in comparison to two 
control groups. One control group was matched to the autistic individuals for age and (moderate) 
learning disability and the other was a younger normally developing control group selected 
to match the approximate verbal and non-verbal mental ages of the autistic participants. The 
autistic group was impaired in comparison to both of the comparison groups only in the final 
stages of the task, that is when an extradimensional shift was required. This study suggests that it 
is not that autistic individuals perseverate in a global sense, rather that they experience an 
autism-specific 'stuck-in-set' perseveration. 
 
The performance of adults with autism has not been assessed using tests of setshifting other than 
the WCST. In the future it will be critical to investigate autistic adults whose general ability falls 
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within the normal range on tasks such as the ID/ED shift in order to establish how widespread a 
stuck-in-set perseveration may be within the autistic spectrum. 
 
Much like the picture that emerged about planning in autism, while the initial view has been that 
autistic individuals show significant numbers of perseverations on tests of mental flexibility in 
comparison to a variety of control groups, detailed consideration of a number of studies and 
issues suggests that the picture is more complex. Since inhibition (discussed separately below) is a 
clear feature of tasks such as the WCST this and mental flexibility should not be within the same 
participants. Furthermore, task presentation may be critical to performance level in autistic 
individuals. For example, when comparing the standard and computerised versions of the WCST 
in a sample of children and adolescents matched for age and full-scale IQ to a group of non-
disabled controls (for inclusion in the study all participants had to have a full-scale IQ of 70 and 
above) Ozonoff (1995) reported that performance of the autism group was particularly attenuated 
in the computer condition. In the future it will be important to focus on the influence of a number 
of factors in order to come to reliable conclusions as to the nature of any mental flexibility deficit 
in autism and the implications of this for a specified theory of executive dysfunction. At present 
important issues would appear to include the influence of verbal ability on mental flexibility as 
well as the impact of learning disability, and any additive effect of autism plus learning disability. 
 
Inhibition in autism 
 
Inhibition is a further aspect of thought and behaviour attributed to executive function that has 
been investigated in autistic samples (see Table 3). The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is a classic 
example of a test of inhibition. In this task the interference of one input can be measured on the 
performance of another (e.g., naming the ink colour of colour words when the word and ink are 
either congruent—the word 'red' printed in red ink—or incongruent—the word 'red' printed in 
green ink). Many Stroop-like tasks have been reported which draw on the fundamental principle 
of the colour Stroop task, with varying degrees of success. Overall, the evidence indicates that 
autistic children and adolescents show equal amounts of interference on this task in comparison 
to normal control groups (Eskes et al., 1990; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). This is in contrast to other 
developmental disorders associated with executive dysfunction such as ADHD (Ozonoff & Jensen, 
1999) and PKU (Diamond, Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997). 
 
The inhibitory ability of autistic individuals has been investigated further. Using a Go/No-Go task 
as well as Stop-Signal and negative priming tasks, Sally Ozonoff and her colleagues compared a 
group of children and adolescents with autism (with fullscale IQs within the normal range) to a 
group of normally developing individuals well-matched to the autistic participants for age, IQ, 
and gender. The findings of two studies assessing vulnerability to perseveration suggest intact 
inhibitory skill in autism. On a Go/No-Go task autistic and normal individuals did not differ in 
a neutral inhibition condition, where on half of 200 presented trials a response must be made and 
on the other half of trials no response must be made. In this instance, no inhibition of cognitive 
set is required (Ozonoff et al., 1994). On a Stop-Signal test, the autistic participants again did not 
differ from the normally developing individuals in their ability to inhibit a motor response to both 
neutral and prepotent stimuli (Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997). On a negative priming task, autistic 
individuals showed the normal level of interference when the target letters in a stimulus had been 
the distractor items on a previous trial. (In this study, participants were shown a string of five 
letters, e.g., 'FTFTF,' and asked to judge whether letters two and four were the same or different. 
Respondents were typically slower and less accurate to make a response when a letter in position 
two or four was shown in positions one, three, and five on the previous trial. This is a standard 
negative priming effect. A more widely used test of negative priming requires participants to 
respond whenever a circle appears. During the first phase of a trial—the prime phase—a 
participant might see a circle and a triangle and must touch the triangle and ignore the circle. 
During the second phase of a trial—the probe phase—if the triangle appears where the circle had 
been a participant's reaction time to touch the triangle is typically slower.) Thus, autistic 
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individuals were equally able to inhibit the processing of irrelevant stimuli in a visual display as 
were their well-matched peers (Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997). Overall, these two studies have 
highlighted that at least two components of inhibition are spared in non-retarded individuals with 
autism. 
 
There is one kind of inhibition that studies have consistently found to be impaired in autism: the 
inhibition of a prepotent response. One illustration of this is given by Russell et al.'s (1991) and 
Hughes and Russell's (1993) studies using the Windows Task. In this task a participant can win a 
desired object (chocolate) by pointing to one of two boxes, one of which can be seen to contain the 
chocolate. However, in order to win the chocolate the participant must point to the empty box, 
that is the one without the chocolate. Children with autism had significant difficulty 
inhibiting their prepotent desire to point to the chocolate, the move that meant that 
the experimenter, rather than the child retained the chocolate. Their perseverative behaviour on 
this task (not responding to the negative feedback of not winning the chocolate) was seen in 
comparison to a mental age matched control group, and has recently been shown across 20 trials 
of an automated version of the Windows Task (Russell, Hala, & Hill, 2003). Hughes and Russell 
(1993) developed a second task involving the inhibition of a prepotent response, without the 
social component of the competitor who was present in the Windows Task. In this 'detour 
reaching task' participants could obtain a marble visible in a box, but only by turning a knob or 
flicking a switch at the side of the box, and not by reaching immediately into the box. Individuals 
with autism found it much more difficult to throw a switch in order to perform an object retrieval 
than children with moderate learning difficulties with whom they were matched for verbal mental 
age (verbal mental age, mean autism 6.58 years SD 2.6; mean MLD 6.17 years SD 1.38). Children 
with autism were less able to inhibit their prepotent response to reach immediately for the marble 
on this task. Further work manipulating this paradigm reported by Bíro and Russell 
(2001) suggests that it may be the apparently arbitrary nature of the rules involved that cause 
particular difficulty in this area of executive functioning for learning disabled children with 
autism. Furthermore, Russell postulates that the difficulty with Tower (planning) tasks and with 
the WCST (set-shifting) is that the rules appear to lack a rationale and that it is this arbitrary 
nature of the rules imposed that leads to the observed autism deficit. Tasks that have an executive 
component but in which rules do not lack a rationale—such as A-not-B tasks (Piaget, 1954) and 
the Tubes task (Hood, 1995)—are passed by children with autism (Russell et al., 1999a, see 
also Russell, 1997, 2002). Such tasks need to be repeated in a sample of normative-IQ 
individuals with autism in order to establish whether the apparently normal ability to inhibit 
identified in the studies of Ozonoff and colleagues described above applies also to the inhibition of 
a prepotent response, or whether the inhibition of a prepotent response is an area of difficulty for 
autistic individuals of all ability levels. It may be that certain inhibition difficulties are present 
only in learning disabled autistic individuals. The influence of general ability level on executive 
functioning in autism will be discussed below. 
 
Generativity in autism 
 
Turner (1997) has postulated difficulties in the capacity to generate novel ideas and behaviours 
spontaneously as an underlying cause of the lack of spontaneity and initiative seen in autism, the 
poverty of speech and action and the apparent failure to engage in pretence. Furthermore, such an 
impairment may also be related to the high rates of repetitive behaviour characteristic of autism 
as well as avoidance and dislike of change (Turner, 1997). 
 
The regulation and generation of novel ideas, which are assumed to involve executive functions, 
have been investigated in autism in a small number of studies (see Table 4). In a drawing study, 
Lewis and Boucher (1991) provide some evidence that successive drawings of children with 
autism show a greater degree of thematic relatedness than equivalent drawings made by non-
autistic control children. Furthermore, on tests of word fluency where an individual must produce 
as many words as possible in one minute, individuals with autism have been shown to be 
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impaired in relation to non-autistic, age, and ability matched controls (Minshew et al., 
1992; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988), although others have failed to find such 
differences (Boucher, 1988; Minshew et al., 1995; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). However, 
the Boucher (1988) study reveals a difficulty in characterising a word fluency task as a good test of 
the generation of novel responses. In this study, children with autism were unimpaired in relation 
to both learning-disabled and age-matched control groups when generating words belonging to a 
specific category (e.g., colours, animals). However, the same children with autism showed 
impoverished responses in comparison to both control groups when asked to produce as many 
miscellaneous (unrelated) words as possible in one minute. In this condition, participants were 
given no cues to aid retrieval of generation strategies. Finally, Jarrold et al. (1996) 
investigated generativity in children with autism through pretend play, finding that while such 
children could engage in the mechanics of pretend play, they showed an impairment in the 
spontaneous production of pretence. The authors argued that this impairment arose from a 
difficulty in generativity. 
 
In a comprehensive study of generativity, Turner (1999) investigated individuals with autism aged 
6–32 years who were grouped according to verbal IQ (76 or above vs. 74 or below) and who were 
compared to age, verbal IQ, and non-verbal IQ as well as verbal mental age matched control 
groups. Tests of verbal fluency (e.g., produce as many words as possible beginning with the letter 
F within 60 s), ideational fluency (e.g., produce as many uses for a newspaper as possible within 
two and a half minutes) and design fluency (e.g., produce as many different designs as possible 
within 5 min) were administered. Responses on the verbal and ideational fluency tests suggested 
that autistic individuals are impaired in the generation of novel responses and behaviour, while 
the findings of the design fluency tests were equally consistent with an impairment in the 
regulation of behaviour through inhibition and/or monitoring. In this study, the 
presence/absence of an autistic diagnosis, rather than IQ, discriminated performance, with those 
high-functioning individuals with autism showing particularly impoverished performance in 
some aspects of the analyses. Importantly, Turner (1997) reported a correlational link in autistic 
individuals between poor performance on ideational and design fluency tasks and high levels of 
repetitive behaviour in daily life. 
 
What would be the consequences of a generativity impairment in autism? Turner (1999) discusses 
this in the following terms: In addition to disrupting spontaneous behaviour, an impaired 
capacity to generate novel behaviour would hinder the execution of routine behaviour where 
changed circumstances occur, or some form of trouble-shooting is required. This is problematic 
because of the need to generate new hypotheses for the restructuring of routine behaviours. This 
happens frequently, for example, adapting the routine for coffee making when the sugar runs out 
or the milk is spilt. Turner argues that this highlights the importance of studying generativity in 
autism as a potential explanation for the ability to control, regulate, and modify behaviour in all 
areas of functioning, and not just those clearly implicated by executive dysfunction accounts of 
autism. Certainly the impact of a generativity deficit in autism and its relationship to all aspects of 
the disorder warrants further, detailed investigation. 
 
Self-monitoring in autism 
 
A further component of executive functions considered in relation to autism is self-monitoring. By 
this is meant the ability to monitor one's own thoughts and actions, as well as to self-correct those 
thoughts and actions (see Table 5). 
 
A deficit in self-monitoring might be seen in perseverative behaviour, since this may be the 
mental operation required for an individual to disengage from the immediate context in order to 
guide behaviour by reference to mental models, changes in the environment or future goals. Self-
monitoring has been the subject of a number of studies of Russell's Cambridge group, who take 
self-monitoring to refer to the subpersonal processes that enable individuals to take themselves to 
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be the source of self-determined changes in perceptual input, actions, and mental episodes. 
There is evidence suggestive of a self-monitoring deficit in autism as seen through autistic deficits 
in tests of motor estimation (Frith & Hermelin, 1969; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1975), error 
correction and avoidance (Russell & Jarrold, 1998), motor error correction (Hughes, 1996), 
impairments of intention monitoring (Phillips et al., 1998), and memory for actions (Russell & 
Jarrold, 1999). These impairments have all been conceptualised post hoc as evidence for 
impairment of executive function, and specifically of self-monitoring (see Russell, 1997, 2002). 
However, studies that have been devised to assess self-monitoring directly have provided little 
evidence of a specific deficit in self-monitoring in individuals with autism with respect to matched 
control groups of both children with moderate learning disability and normally 
developing children (Hill & Russell, 2002; Russell & Hill, 2001). Thus, the evidence 
concerning an impairment in self-monitoring in autistic individuals is mixed and further detailed, 
theory-driven studies are needed. In addition, the specific tasks used have generally been new, 
experimental tasks in the sense that they have not been widely tested and are not, therefore, well-
known tests of executive function. 
 
Executive function in autism across the lifespan 
 
The majority of studies cited above recruited children and adolescents with autism as 
participants. These studies have highlighted areas of executive dysfunction in autistic individuals 
in the context of preserved ability in other neuropsychological domains and in individuals of 
varied IQ levels. However, in order to evaluate the possible role of executive dysfunction in the 
autistic disorder (as either a primary or secondary deficit), it is necessary to have a picture of 
executive functioning across the typical lifespan. 
 
The neural circuitry that forms the core of prefrontal cortex begins to develop by the second 
trimester of pregnancy (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Post-natally the frontal lobes are the brain areas 
that take the longest to mature. Indeed, they are considered to develop over the first 20 years of 
life (e.g. Giedd et al., 1996, 1999; Huttenlocher, 1979, 1990; Sowell et al., 1999a, Sowell, 
Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 1999b, 2001). In the past, research tended to 
underestimate the executive function abilities of children and it was generally thought that frontal 
lobe development started later in childhood. More recent physiological and psychological 
evidence suggests that rapid changes occur in the development of the frontal lobes far earlier 
than was previously thought, between 6 and 12 months (e.g. Chugani, 1994; Goldman- Rakic, 
1987) with a corresponding increase in behavioural abilities at this time including language, 
mobility, and coordination. Furthermore, executive functions may emerge in a multi-stage 
process that is consistent with the growth spurts identified within anterior brain regions (see 
Anderson, Levin, & Jacobs, 2002). Subcomponents of executive functions may possess different 
developmental trajectories and mature at different rates (Anderson et al., 2002; Diamond, 2002; 
Fischer, Biscaldi, & Gezeck, 1997; Zelazo, Reznick, & Pinon, 1995, 1996, 1997). The behaviour 
measured would thus reflect mediation by different areas of the frontal lobes as they 
mature differentially. It is plausible that greater understanding of this maturation 
process, combined with cautious integration of information gleaned from the behaviour 
of patients with acquired frontal lobe lesions, could help increase understanding of the pattern of 
intact and impaired executive function performance in autism. 
 
A number of studies have considered the development of executive functions in normally 
developing children. For example, Levin, Culhane, Hartmann, Evankovich, and Mattson (1991) 
report data from normally developing 7–8, 9–12, and 13–15 year olds on a series of tests believed 
to be associated with frontal lobe function including the WCST, Californian Verbal Learning test 
(CVLT), word fluency, animal naming, design fluency, twenty questions, Go/No-Go, the Tower of 
London and a delayed alternation task. Significant performance differences existed between the 
age groups on all tasks except one (delayed alternation). However, particularly striking gains were 
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seen at different ages on different tasks. For example, impressive gains in concept formation, the 
capacity to shift set and to suppress inappropriate responses were seen before adolescence on the 
WCST, as well as a major decrease in the number of false positives produced on the Go/No-Go 
task. In contrast, significant improvements in performance on the Tower of London task were not 
observed until adolescence when improvements in planning and execution of sequences 
were observed. Additionally, adolescents showed a significant increase in their ability to utilise 
semantic information in the 20 questions task and to cluster responses on the CVLT. A principal 
component analysis revealed three factors: a semantic association/ concept formation factor, a 
freedom from perseveration factor, and a planning/ strategy factor. Longitudinal study across a 
wider age range than that included by Levin et al. would identify more specifically the nature of 
these factors as well as indicating whether they mature at different times. 
 
More recent studies have started to fractionate research of executive functions in young children. 
For example, Diamond and her colleagues have focused on studying improvements in cognitive 
functions that depend on the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), across childhood. By adopting tasks used with monkeys it is possible to test 
young children who are not able to be assessed using standard neuropsychological tests of 
frontal lobe function. Findings that young children improve on the delayed response (similar to 
Piaget's A-not-B task) and object retrieval (Diamond, 1988, 1990, 1991) tasks over the first year of 
life, in combination with anatomical and biochemical evidence of PFC maturation during this 
time suggest that early changes are seen. These changes continue throughout childhood and into 
adulthood (see Diamond, 2002). They are shown across a range of tasks such as inhibition of a 
prepotent response (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000), the day–night task (Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994), Luria's tapping test (e.g. Diamond & Taylor, 1996), and the directional Stroop 
task (Davidson, Cruess, Diamond, O_Craven, & Savoy, 1999). 
 
As noted previously, only a handful of studies have recruited autistic adult participants, and these 
have reported deficits in the two executive domains assessed, planning, and mental flexibility. 
What though of the performance of preschool-aged children with autism on tests of executive 
function? A small handful of fairly recent studies have investigated executive functions in this 
population. Given the extended development of the frontal lobes and therefore executive 
functions, and the complexity of tasks of executive function used with older children and adults, it 
is unfortunately not possible to use the tasks described in early sections of this paper with young 
children. Other tasks must be drawn on and parallels made. 
 
Geraldine Dawson and her colleagues have investigated the neuropsychological correlates of the 
early symptoms of autism in children younger than those included in the studies described above. 
Across two studies, tasks considered to tap frontal lobe function that are appropriate for very 
young children (tasks requiring no linguistic response) were employed. In comparison to 
developmentally matched (for receptive language) normally developing children and children 
with Down syndrome, autistic children (mean age, 64.6 months) were impaired on a delayed 
response task (similar to the A-not-B task in infants) when non-verbal mental age had been 
covaried. This task is one on which performance is impaired in non-human primates following 
lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The same pattern of performance was observed on a 
delayed non-matching to sample task (DNMS), again with non-verbal mental age covaried. This 
task is believed to implicate the ventromedial frontal cortex, and particularly the orbital 
prefrontal region. Furthermore, performance on the DNMS task was correlated (in the autistic 
group only) with severity of autistic symptoms at the time of testing including shared attention, 
symbolic play, and responses to emotional stimuli (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, & Rinaldi, 1998). 
 
In a later study, Dawson et al. (2002a) pursued their 1998 findings in a sample still younger 
(children aged 36–48 months), investigating the performance of autistic children, matched 
developmentally to two comparison groups, children with a developmental delay and normally 
developing children, on a series of tasks of ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal function. The 
tests of ventromedial prefrontal function employed were delayed non-matching to sample and 
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object discrimination reversal. The tests of dorsolateral prefrontal function included were the A-
not-B task, A-not- B with invisible displacement, and spatial reversal. Intriguingly in this study 
there was no autism-specific pattern of performance, suggesting that at this early age 
executive dysfunction is not characteristic of autism. However, performance on ventromedial (but 
not dorsolateral) prefrontal tasks was strongly correlated with joint attention ability. Joint 
attention develops rapidly from 6 to 12 months of age and its lack of presence is an early indicator 
of autism (e.g., Osterling & Dawson, 1994). Indeed poor joint attention appears to be unique to, 
and almost totally universal in the disorder. It involves the triadic coordination or sharing of 
attention between the infant, another person and an object or event. Looking at another 
person and pointing to a cup to request a drink or looking at another person and pointing to a toy 
to share enjoyment are examples of this skill. 
 
McEvoy, Rogers, and Pennington (1993) tested young autistic children (mean age 5 years) in 
comparison to a group of developmentally delayed children matched for age, SES, and non-verbal 
ability as well as to a group of normally developing children matched for SES and verbal mental 
age. Four well-validated tests of executive function that have been used extensively to explore 
prefrontal function in non-human primate studies and more recently to study the development of 
executive function in infants (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1986) were employed. Specifically, 
the A-not-B, delayed response, spatial reversal, and alternation tasks were employed in this study. 
An autism-specific impairment was found only on the spatial reversal task, in which the autists 
exhibited significantly more perseverative responses than both other groups (who did not differ 
from each other). Performance on each of the remaining three tasks exhibited floor or ceiling 
effects. Thus, young children with autism experienced selective deficits in the tests of executive 
function assessed by McEvoy et al., as had the older sample of preschoolers reported by Dawson 
et al. (1998). 
 
Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, and Rogers (1999) pursued the line of investigation started by 
McEvoy et al. (1993) in two studies of young children with autism in comparison to a 
developmentally delayed clinical control group matched on age, verbal and non-verbal ability. In 
the first phase, children in both groups had a mean age of 51 months and were assessed on seven 
tasks of executive function (A-not-B with invisible displacement, 3- and 6 boxes stationary, 3- and 
6 boxes scrambled, object retrieval, and spatial reversal). On no task were the autistic participants 
impaired in relation to the matched, developmentally delayed controls. In a follow-up study, 
a subset of the original sample was tested on the spatial reversal test one year later. In this study, 
the performance of neither group improved significantly over the course of one year. However, 
there was a trend towards an improvement in the developmentally delayed children that was not 
evident in the autistic group. 
 
Interestingly, then, it has proved difficult to identify widespread executive dysfunction in 
prefrontal function in preschool children with autism. An overview of these four studies suggests 
that it is only in the older children that deficits become apparent. Perhaps, then, executive 
dysfunction in autism is not evident until later in life? Given the slow maturation of the frontal 
lobes it would not, perhaps, be surprising if this were the case. However, there is growing 
evidence for the influence of prefrontal cortex in the control of executive functions in infancy 
(Diamond, 1990, 1991; Diamond et al., 1997) and therefore the late emergence of such deficits in 
autism may point to certain explanations of the apparent executive dysfunction seen in older 
individuals with autism. There are number of explanations: For example, it could be (i) that a 
well-functioning prefrontal cortex undergoes deterioration in later childhood development, (ii) 
that prefrontal cortex is sufficient to subserve the simplest executive functions but fails to 
adequately mature past a given level, or (iii) that interference from elsewhere (perhaps from too 
many extraneous projections) expands over time. In a recent review, Frith (2003) speculated that 
poor pruning occurs in autism. The normal pruning process occurs several times during 
development after an initial wave of proliferation of synapses (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 
1997). Pruning eliminates faulty connections and optimises coordinated neural functioning. Lack 
of pruning in autism may be associated with poor functioning of certain neural circuits. For 
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example, the synapses of so-called feedback (top–down) systems fail to be pruned while feed-
forward (bottom–up) systems are normal. Moreover, the nature of the deficit might also be 
expected to change over time, in line with further maturation (or lack thereof) of the relevant 
brain structures. It remains to be seen whether more sensitive tasks would highlight an autism-
specific impairment at a young age. Certainly further study is needed, and in particular 
longitudinal studies tracking participants over the lifespan using comparable tests are needed. 
These questions are critical as since the emergence of the executive dysfunction account of autism 
much has been speculated about the role of the putative dysfunction in autism and in particular 
its causal role in the disorder (see especially papers in Russell, 1997). To date, however, it seems 
difficult to conclude whether or not executive dysfunction is a characteristic of the preschool 
autistic child. This is because normally developing children do not perform particularly well on 
the tests under consideration and therefore the performance of young children with autism 
cannot be confidently distinguished statistically in one direction or another from other groups at 
this age. Whether or not this provides evidence against the speculation that executive dysfunction 
is a primary deficit to the disorder (Ozonoff et al., 1991) remains to be seen. 
Executive function and the broader autism phenotype 
 
A small, but increasing number of studies are highlighting the existence of a broader cognitive 
phenotype of autism (see Bailey, Palferman, Heavey, & Le Couteur, 1998 for a review), and these 
may help to elucidate the causes of autism. In essence, a broader cognitive phenotype exists when 
close relatives of an individual with autism show a raised incidence of cognitive performance 
associated with the diagnosis of autism, but to a mild degree that does not put them into the 
category of being diagnosed with autism themselves. A handful of studies have investigated 
executive functioning in the biological relatives of autistic individuals. Using the Tower of London 
and Intra-/extradimensional (ID/ED) shift tasks described above, Hughes, Leboyer, and Bouvard 
(1997) reported that the parents, and especially fathers, of children with autism showed relatively 
poor planning and attentional flexibility skills in comparison to both the parents of children with 
learning disability and children with no disorder. All groups performed equally well on a test of 
spatial span and on non-executive aspects of the Tower and ID/ED shift tasks, thereby ruling 
out an explanation of the difference in terms of ability or motivational factors. Using the same 
tasks Hughes, Plumet, and Leboyer (1999) identified difficulties in executive function in the non-
autistic siblings of children with autism, while Ozonoff, Rogers, Farnham, and Pennington (1993) 
reported a similar finding in performance on a four-ring Tower of Hanoi task, and a trend 
towards such a significant difference on the WCST. The parents of two children with autism have 
been shown to be impaired in comparison to parents of children with Down Syndrome on the 
Tower of Hanoi task (Piven & Palmer, 1997). Thus, evidence of a broader autism phenotype 
is provided in the executive domain. Aspects of the other two main cognitive theories of autism 
have been found in the broader phenotype providing good evidence for its existence across broad 
areas of its features (e.g. Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 2001). 
Dawson and colleagues have argued recently that executive function is one of six candidate 
broader autism phenotype measures for the focus of genetic studies (Dawson et al., 2002b). 
Integrating genetic, brain, and behavioural perspectives must be key for future progress in the 
understanding of autism. 
Autism and the frontal lobes 
 
Since the term executive function is a cognitive construct used to describe behaviours thought to 
be mediated by the frontal lobes, these structures are also referred to in relation to autism. An 
integration of the behavioural findings in autism and the known brain abnormalities underlying 
similar behaviours in patients with acquired damage to the frontal lobes of the brain, and other 
disorders which lead to executive dysfunction, accords well with the notion of abnormalities in the 
prefrontal cortex and its connections with other brain structures such the basal ganglia, 
striatum, and cerebellum in individuals with autism (Duncan & Owen, 2000; Robbins, 
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1997; Shallice, 1988). In a detailed behavioural study of patients with focal frontal or posterior 
lesions and controls matched for age, gender, education, and handedness, Stuss et al. (2000) have 
shown the importance of medial and dorsolateral frontal structures in the WCST. Furthermore, 
multi-tasking (which requires considerable numbers of executive functions) has been shown to be 
impaired in patients who have acquired frontal lobe damage even when an executive function 
deficit is small or indeed undetectable using traditional neuropsychological tests such as the 
WCST (Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice, 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1993). The use of 
neuroimaging, in combination with behavioural assessments thus allows the fractionation of 
brain structures. Taken together, the findings of behavioural and neuroimaging studies may help 
guide research in autism by suggesting parallels between neurological patients with acquired 
damage to the frontal lobes and some of the behavioural difficulties reported by autistic 
individuals. While valuable, such comparisons must be made with some caution since acquired 
and developmental disorders, while linked to the same neuroanatomical regions, are unlikely to 
be entirely similar. 
 
Studies of the structure of the autistic brain are limited (see review by Brambilla et al., 2003). 
Many regions of the brain have been implicated but the neurobiological basis of the disorder 
remains unknown. A handful of neuroanatomical studies has reported distinct abnormalities in a 
number of cortical (focusing on frontal and temporal lobes and the cerebellum) and subcortical 
regions (focussing on the amygdala and hippocampus), but the results are inconsistent (e.g. Abell 
et al., 1999; Aylward et al., 1999; Bailey, Luthert et al., 1998; Bauman & Kemper, 1994; 
Courchesne, Yeung-Courchesne, Press, Hesselink, & Jernigan, 1988; Haznedar et al., 2001; 
Kemper & Bauman, 1998; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001). Conclusions are 
hindered by the fact that abnormalities do not appear to be consistent across all brains studied. 
Neuroanatomical abnormalities in the limbic system and cerebellum would certainly be 
consistent with prefrontal damage, since all three brain areas are intimately connected (Damasio 
& van Hoesen, 1983). Consistent with a frontal cortex dysfunction, transient delayed postnatal 
maturation of the frontal lobes has been reported (Zilbovicius et al., 1995). Serotinergic 
abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex (also the thalamus and dentate nucleus) have been 
identified in a PET study of autistic boys (Chugani et al., 1997). Finally, using single case voxel-
based morphometric analysis, Salmond, de Haan, Friston, Gadian, and Vargha-Khadem (2003) 
report that 13 of 14 autistic children and adolescents (aged 8–18 years) showed evidence of 
abnormality in the orbitofrontal cortex. Structural abnormality in this area was seen in far more 
cases than in the other regions of interest reported (amygdala, cerebellum, hippocampal 
formation, and superior temporal gyrus). These regions can be accounted for from a 
developmental perspective, as early damage to one brain area could change the structure and 
function of another, with cascading effects on further development across connected structures. It 
remains to be seen whether further structural MRI and other neuroanatomical studies of the 
brains of autistic individuals will support this notion. 
 
A number of functional neuroimaging studies of autistic behaviour have been published (see 
Frith, 2001 and Cody, Pelphrey, & Piven, 2002; for recent reviews). However, only one or two of 
these have utilised any kind of executive function task. One exception has used functional MRI 
(fMRI) to investigate the performance of non-mentally retarded individuals in relation to healthy 
volunteers on an occulomotor spatial working memory task and a visually guided saccade task. 
Significantly less task-related activity was seen in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior 
cingulate cortex in the autistic individuals, but no other differences in activation of 
spatial working memory circuitry. This study suggests abnormalities in neocortical circuitry of 
autistic individuals (Luna et al., 2002). In addition, using fMRI Müller, Pierce, Ambrose, Allen, 
and Courchesne (2001) investigated the performance of eight high-functioning autistic males 
(mean age 28 years) in comparison to a group of eight normal males matched for age and 
handedness. Participants were asked to perform a simple visually paced finger movement task, 
which could be seen to reflect aspects of executive function involved in the planning and 
execution of a prompted action sequence. Neural activity during this task was compared to a 
control task in which identical visual stimulation was given, but no motor response was required. 
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In a group analysis, activations of identical brain areas were seen in both the autistic and non-
autistic individuals. Of particular interest here is the finding of reduced deactivation (that is, 
greater activation) in posterior and prefrontal cortices in the autism group only. 
 
A number of explanations for the link between brain and behaviour have been raised in relation to 
autism and executive dysfunction. One of these has hypothesised executive dysfunction to be a 
consequence of abnormalities in medial temporal lobe (MTL) function, with variability in 
performance on executive tasks arising from the varying severity of MTL brain abnormalities 
(Dawson et al., 2002b). Two versions of this account place executive dysfunction as associated to, 
rather than causal to the core autistic symptoms. By this account, impairments in 
prefrontal function in older individuals with autism are secondary consequences of early MTL 
dysfunction, consequences that do not become apparent until the frontal lobes mature. 
 
An alternative view is that a more direct link exists between frontal lobe abnormality and 
executive dysfunction. Autistic performance may be tied to dysfunctional integration of the 
frontal lobes with the rest of the brain, abnormal developments in neuronal sophistication and/or 
abnormal myelinisation (see Dawson et al., 2002b; Luna et al., 2002). Findings of transient 
delayed postnatal maturation of the frontal lobes in autism (Salmond et al., 2003; Zilbovicius et 
al., 1995) and reduced functional connectivity of frontal cortex with other cortical and subcortical 
regions (see Luna et al., 2002) support this view. The failure of the frontal lobes to follow a 
normal maturational pattern is likely to have long-term consequences for all development. This 
abnormality might be reflected differentially over time as the impact of abnormal development on 
that of other connected systems is seen. Clearly further study is needed, and in particular 
longitudinal studies tracking participants over their lifespan using comparable tests. Detailed 
functional imaging studies of tasks of executive function, as well as detailed studies of brain 
structure will be critical if we are to understand more appropriately the extent of executive 
dysfunction in the autist, and the implications of such dysfunction. 
Frontal lobe development and autism 
 
As autism is a developmental disorder, the developmental impact of damage to particular brain 
structures on performance must be considered more directly in the future. Given the late maturity 
of the frontal lobes, with the prefrontal cortex for example not being fully mature either 
physiologically or structurally until mid-adolescence (Diamond & Doar, 1989; Huttenlocher & 
Dabholkar, 1997; Luciana & Nelson, 1998; Mesulam, 2002), it would be unsurprising if their 
development is altered in autism, since these structures are intimately connected to many of 
the brain areas also implicated in autism (e.g., cerebellum). The cerebellum is 
consistently activated during any cognitive task in which dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
activated, over and independent of any motor requirements of task (Diamond, 2000, 2002). 
Abnormality of development from birth would have long-term consequences for all development. 
This abnormality might only be reflected later in development and contrasts with breakdown in 
cognitive function following an acquired mental disorder that first manifests itself when the 
development of various abilities is completed. In this case we expect breakdown, perhaps 
regression or progressive deterioration, but all superimposed on previously established skills. 
The importance of this perspective can be seen in the two adult cases reported by Price, Daffner, 
Stowe, and Mesulam (1990). These two individuals suffered bilateral prefrontal damage early in 
life and presented later with immature development in the realms of insight, foresight, social 
judgement, empathy, and complex reasoning. These can be seen to reflect poor executive 
functioning and are reminiscent of autistic behaviour. 
The relationship between executive dysfunction and social 
impairments in autism 
Since the emergence of the executive dysfunction account of autism there has been much debate 
over the potential relationship between this and the theory of mind (also termed, mentalising) 
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deficit account of autism. Three positions have emerged. First, it has been argued that the 
development of executive functions allows the child's theory of mind to develop (e.g., Ozonoff, 
1997; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 1996, 1997, 2002). Second it has been argued that there are no 
specific systems for processing mental states and that performance on theory of mind tasks can be 
reduced to executive function ability (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995, 1996). Poor performance on a 
test of false belief, for example, would arise where there is a deficit in the ability to inhibit a 
prepotent response while holding in working memory some action- relevant information. A third 
position takes the opposing view of the first, arguing that the capacity to represent mental states is 
necessary for the development of executive function (e.g., Carruthers, 1996; Perner, 1998; Perner 
& Lang, 2000). By this account, an individual must be able to represent their own intentions in 
order to plan ahead. Other executive functions, such as inhibitory control and set-shifting, require 
a representation of one's knowledge that the current act is maladaptive (Perner, 1998). 
 
Recent research has shed some light on the possible direction of any relationship between 
executive functioning and mentalising. Studies that relate success and failure on particular 
executive function tasks to performance on theory of mind tests are critical in this regard. In 
normally developing preschool children, correlations have been found between tests of inhibitory 
control and attentional flexibility, and a test of deceit (Hughes, 1998a).Moreover, performance on 
tests of executive function predicts performance on theory of mind tests. The reverse association 
is not seen (Hughes, 1998b). These findings with normally developing children, integrated 
with the findings that autistic individuals perform poorly on tests of executive function as well as 
tests of theory of mind suggest that the difficulty that autistic individuals have on theory of mind 
tests is at least in part attributable to their lack of executive control. Whether this is the case in 
both normal and autistic development is unclear: Ozonoff et al. (1991) found a correlation 
between performance on executive function and theory of mind tasks in high-functioning children 
and adolescents with autism, but not in a matched group of developmentally delayed controls. 
The difficulties experienced by autistic children with inhibitory control and attentional flexibility 
are particularly enlightening since these are the two components of executive function that have 
been shown to predict theory of mind performance in normal children (Hughes, 1998a). Thus, 
increasingly evidence from studies of normally developing and autistic children on tests of theory 
of mind and executive functions are suggesting that there is a complex relationship between 
executive function and theory of mind. 
 
While the data above are relevant, they are not able to distinguish between the different accounts 
of the developmental interaction between theory of mind and executive function. This is for two 
reasons. First, the complexity of tests of executive functioning is mirrored in most tests of theory 
of mind such that these tasks may not be 'pure' tests of theory of mind but may also involve an 
executive component. This has been reflected, for example, in the false photograph test (Leekam 
& Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Russell et al., 1999b). Given this complexity, a lack 
of dissociation or the existence of correlations between theory of mind and executive function 
tasks should be expected. However, it is unlikely that we can account entirely for associations in 
this way since Perner and Lang (2000) report that the association between theory of mind and 
executive function performance is found even when theory of mind tasks that are reputed to have 
a low executive component are used. A second explanation of any interaction between theory of 
mind and executive function could arise from the anatomical proximity of the brain regions 
that mediate these two cognitive processes. Given the importance of prefrontal circuits in 
executive functions (see review by Duncan & Owen, 2000) and the proposed role of medial frontal 
areas in theory of mind processing (see review by Frith & Frith, 2003), this account of the data is 
not implausible. 
 
Patients with acquired damage to the frontal lobe can also be recruited to consider the 
relationship between executive function and mentalising, with its implications for the possibility 
of frontal lobe dysfunction in autism. One patient, MR, has been reported who performs poorly on 
the WCST, while performing well on mentalising tasks (Varley, Siegal, & Want, 2001). In contrast, 
Fine, Lumsden, and Blair (2001) have reported a case (BM) who shows the opposite profile. In 
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this rigorous study, BM showed impaired performance on a range of mentalising tests in the 
context of intact performance on all of 16 tests of executive function administered (including the 
WCST, the ID/ED shift and Tower of London tasks). It is tempting to interpret these two studies 
as highlighting a double dissociation between the two cognitive processes. However, at this stage 
we should be cautious since the case of MR, with a diagnosis of severe aphasia, was assessed on 
only one dimension of executive function (set-shifting). Furthermore, he had sustained damage to 
a number of brain structures including parts of the parietal lobe, as well as subcortical damage to 
association fibres running between posterior sensory zones and the frontal lobe. This 
patient's poor performance on the WCST, which has a large visuospatial component, may be 
accounted for by this damage (see Stuss et al., 2000). Further detailed testing of MR, and other 
patients is required. 
 
Studies have also been reported of patients with acquired brain damage who perform poorly on 
tests of both executive function and theory of mind. Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, and Morris (2001) 
observed that patients with unilateral right- or left-frontal lobe lesions performed badly on both 
mentalising tasks and executive tasks. (The latter assessed initiation, inhibition, mental-
flexibility, and sequencing.) Gregory et al. (2002) reported similar results in cases of frontal 
variant frontotemporal dementia. (Executive function was assessed using the WCST and a verbal 
fluency test.) Statistical analyses in both studies are reported to indicate that poor performance in 
one cognitive domain was not related to poor performance in the other cognitive domain. 
 
Combined, these various approaches to understanding the relationship between two key cognitive 
explanations of autism highlight the complexity of any relationship. In particular, clarity is 
hampered by the use of different samples and tests, and different causes of brain damage 
(acquired but isolated vs. developmental vs. dementia). More detailed understanding of the 
brain–behaviour relationship of each component of executive functions will provide clearer 
hypotheses on which to work. It will be useful in the future to pursue more studies of the 'normal' 
and 'abnormal' brain of the kind reported by Stuss et al. (2000). These authors conducted 
a validation of the relationship between the WCST and 'frontal functions' by careful analysis of 
patients with brain disease. A similar study using an experimental task reported recently by 
Sylvester et al. (2003) is a further example. Both studies provide evidence that executive 
processes are distinct from one another but nonetheless work together in order to meet a 
particular common goal. Thus, executive functioning is a complex multifactorial cognitive 
construct and can be seen to be composed of both common and distinct mechanisms. It is not one 
unitary process that is implemented to complete any one task. Common selective attention 
mechanisms may be initiated but the actual manipulation of information attended to may be 
carried out by different neural areas that implement different executive functions such as the 
switching of attention and the resolution of interference. Understanding how these cognitive 
processes interact to implement executive control will be a central challenge for future research. 
The study of the structure of the frontal lobes of the autistic brain, as well as brain activation 
patterns in the autistic brain while tasks of executive function are being performed will inform 
this relationship, and vice versa. 
Problems with the executive function account of autism 
 
There is thus clear evidence that individuals with autism experience deficits in areas of executive 
functioning, and this cognitive theory has gained much ground in recent years. However, there 
are some problems with this account. One difficulty arises from a lack of consensus as to which 
aspects of executive function are typical of autism. Another comes from the rather restricted age 
and ability ranges of the samples assessed. A perhaps more striking difficulty arises from the fact 
that executive dysfunction is found in clinical conditions other than autism (e.g., attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder; ADHD). Certainly this problem limits the potential to use executive 
dysfunction as a diagnostic marker for autism. It may be that this difficulty will be resolved in the 
light of future detailed work investigating executive functions in autism. A useful example of such 
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an approach is found in Ozonoff and Jensen (1999) who assessed three groups of children with a 
clinical condition believed to be associated with executive dysfunction (autism, ADHD, and 
Tourette syndrome) as well as a normally developing control group. The groups were matched for 
chronological age and full-scale IQ. All participants completed a test of planning (Tower of 
Hanoi), cognitive set-shifting (Wisconsin Card Sorting test), and a test of inhibition (Stroop test). 
Differential performance between the groups was found across the executive function 
tasks. Specifically, children with autism were the only clinical group impaired in relation to all 
three other groups on both the test of planning and cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the children 
with ADHD alone were impaired relative to the two clinical and the normal control groups on the 
test of inhibition. This study suggests that there is a specific pattern of executive dysfunction that 
distinguishes autism from other developmental disorders associated with executive dysfunction. 
A recent selective review of literature considering whether executive function deficits are 
specific to ADHD, in which studies of ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), conduct 
disorder (CD), and autism are compared, suggests that while these disorders are all associated 
with executive function deficits, there are strong differences between these groups and normally 
developing individuals in executive functioning (Sergeant et al., 2002). Thus, specific executive 
performance profiles differentiate between these clinical groups. However, a recent study has 
shown a less clear difference in planning ability between boys with a diagnosis of either autism or 
ADHD. Booth et al. (2003) used a drawing task in which planning for the inclusion of a new 
element was measured. Planning deficits were seen in their sample of boys with autism as well as 
those with ADHD, in comparison to typically developing children. These difficulties were more 
noticeable in the autism group. Clearly, detailed studies of executive functioning in different 
clinical populations associated with executive function deficits are needed. If such studies support 
a specific but differential profile of executive dysfunction in these disorders then the possibility 
will arise of using measures of executive function as a marker for the diagnosis of autism. 
 
A further difficulty with the executive dysfunction account of autism is that, while such difficulties 
appear to be common, they may not be a universal feature of autism. Certain studies have found 
that the tests of executive function that they have employed have not been problematic for all 
autistic individuals with normal IQ levels (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford, 
1999; Russell & Hill, 2001; Hill & Russell, 2002). However, as yet, the universality of executive 
dysfunction in autism cannot be ruled out. Looking to the neuropsychological literature can 
provide some possible directions for future investigation of the universality of executive 
dysfunction in autism. Studies of certain patients with acquired damage to the frontal lobes show 
unique deficits in multitasking along side little or no impairment on measures of executive 
function such as Tower and WCST tasks. However these patients, first reported by Shallice and 
Burgess (1991), show marked impairments in everyday life. These patients have been described as 
having a 'strategy application disorder,' a specific deficit in multitasking, which includes 
planning, and retrospective memory, prospective memory (see Burgess et al., 2000 for 
full discussion of multitasking). Examples of tests of multitasking are the Multiple Errands task 
(Shallice & Burgess, 1991), the Six Elements subtest of the BADS (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, 
Emslie, & Evans, 1996) or the related Greenwich test (Burgess et al., 2000). In these tests 
participants are presented with a series of tasks that they must attempt within a specified time 
frame. They are also given a number of rules that they must follow in order to complete the test 
correctly, that they must not complete two parts of the same activity consecutively for example. 
Not only are such patients impaired on tests of multitasking, but their performance on the Six 
Elements task has been shown to correlate highly with their relative or carer's assessment of their 
difficulty in realising plans in daily life. A similar association was not seen between daily life skill 
and other tests of executive function (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). It seems likely that such subtle 
yet striking impairments may also be seen in autistic individuals with normal IQ levels who are 
not, as yet, considered to have an executive function deficit. At the Institute of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, we are conducting just such a study, assessing traditional 
neuropsychological tests of executive function such as the WCST and the Stroop test alongside a 
range of tests more sensitive to executive deficits clearly seen in daily life such as the Six Elements 
test. The results of this study will be forthcoming shortly. 
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What is the influence of general ability on executive functioning? At this stage it is unclear how 
great the impact of the presence/absence of a learning disability is on the executive functioning of 
the autistic groups studied. It is certainly the case that adult studies of executive function tend to 
focus only on individuals with an IQ above 85 (i.e., within the normal range). The question must 
therefore be addressed by assessing autistic individuals whose IQs fall within the normal range in 
comparison to appropriate control groups. This question is becoming more and more pertinent as 
increasing numbers of people with Asperger syndrome (considered to be a form of high-
functioning autism) are being diagnosed. These individuals have IQs well within the normal 
range, they tend to have been educated in mainstream schools and may even be diagnosed only in 
adulthood. Yet they experience striking difficulties in the core areas of autistic dysfunction. 
Anecdotally these difficulties relate very much to the executive domain. The results of our ongoing 
study, mentioned above, will help to identify the pattern of executive functioning in autism as well 
as its universality. This understanding has the potential to impact positively on the remediation of 
real-life deficits in executive function, for example, to strengthen planning and organisational 
strategies by teaching skills to shift from ineffective planning strategies. 
Final comments 
 
Before concluding this review of executive function, the value of the overall approach in 
understanding autism should be considered. Given the contradictory findings, the apparent 
difficulty in identifying whether executive deficits exist in young children with autism, and the 
reported lack of universality of executive dysfunction in laboratory tests, one might be tempted to 
conclude that the theory has little to contribute to our understanding of autistic disorder. 
However, the theory is far from ready to be dropped as one of the key cognitive theories of the 
condition. Research in this area is still in its infancy, and needs to be further informed in the 
future by advances in understanding of the normal development and function of the frontal lobes 
as well as understanding of the neuropsychological findings. Given the, albeit anecdotal, sense of 
executive impairments in daily life in autistic individuals, it may be time to focus on a more 
cognitive and neuroanatomical framework of executive systems, and use this model to guide 
investigations in the future. One perspective on disorders of executive systems is that they result 
from damage to a higher level supervisory system. Following Norman and Shallice (1986), 
Shallice and Burgess (e.g. Shallice, 2002; Shallice & Burgess, 1996) have outlined a cognitive 
model of executive function, centred on the frontal lobes and particularly on prefrontal cortex, in 
which a higher-order system—the Supervisory System—is responsible for control of non-routine 
operations (clearly involved in tasks such the Tower of London and WCST) and a contention 
scheduler is involved in carrying out routine operations. By assessing tasks that would be 
predicted to be controlled by one or other of these systems within the same sample, it may be 
possible to fractionate the high-level executive system and its dysfunction in autism. 
Furthermore, by considering performance on a wide range of tasks, with clear stages of 
progression (such as the ID/ED shift task) and tightly matched control tasks (such as the 
inhibition studies of Ozonoff et al.) in well-matched participant groups it will be possible to 
establish clearer performance profiles of executive function. Furthermore, by fractionating the 
high-level executive system and by being able to make neuropsychological and 
neuroanatomical parallels, significant progress in understanding executive functioning in 
autism should now be possible. Finally, the developmental pattern of executive dysfunction in 
autism remains unclear and will benefit from detailed longitudinal study across the lifespan. 
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